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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the development of democracy in
Senegal, one of the few democracies in Africa. It will

focus on analyzing a historical background of Senegal
starting at the beginning of the twentieth century. This

historical background will conclude on August 20, 1959,
when Senegal became an independent nation. It will then

focus on the political events following independence that
saw Senegal transform from a one-party state to a

competitive , multiparty democracy. This development was

driven by the political opposition in its desire for
political equality, Senegal's general population, and by

the actions of Senegal's political leaders.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Background
Senegal is designated as a partly free, electoral

democracy by the Freedom House Index1 (Freedom House Index,
2010). This is significant as there are few examples of
democracies on the African continent and most are extremely

fragile (Bratton & Mattes, 2001). According to the Freedom
House Index (2010), an electoral democracy exists when a

country' s political institutions meet a number of
standards. First, the establishment of a competitive,

multiparty political system is essential. The country must

also have granted universal adult suffrage to the citizens
of the country. Third, it must have a set schedule of

elections that protect voter secrecy and that are in the
absence of voter fraud. Finally, political parties must

have the ability to reach the electorate through media and

open campaigning.

1 The Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization that promotes
democracy and advocates for human rights worldwide. The Index is a
measure that ranks each country based on its civil liberties and
political freedom. For more information, please visit
http://www.freedomhouse.org.
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Literature Review

In order to understand how democracy succeeds in
Senegal, it is necessary to come to some general

understanding on what democracy is. One of the most widely
cited examples of democracy comes from the work of Robert

Dahl. Dahl (1971) identifies eight democratic institutions

that are necessary in order for a government to be a
democracy: freedom of association, freedom of expression,
the right to vote, unbiased sources of political

information, universal eligibility for office, the right to
campaign, free and fair elections, and making government

policies depend on an electoral mandate. This is the most
comprehensive definition of democracy when it comes to pure
political criteria, but does not touch on some of the

things that are crucial to the average person living in a
country. Some of these things will be addressed later by

other authors.
Michael Bratton & Robert Mattes (2007) argue that
democracy is a political system that allows groups of

people to compete for power. Also, it is a system that

allows citizens to elect representatives to make binding
decisions for themselves and the country. While these are

important concepts, further specialization is needed for a
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viable definition of democracy. Larry Diamond, Juan J.
Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset (1988) offer a more in-depth

definition of democracy that revolves around political

competition, participation, and the existence of civil and
political liberties. For this definition, the authors state

that they are attempting to define democracy in political

terms without connecting it to economic and social
conditions. According to these authors, democracy is:

A system of government that meets three essential
conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among
individuals and organized groups (especially political

parties) for all effective positions of government

power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of
force; a highly inclusive level of political

participation in the selection of leaders and
policies, at least through regular and fair elections,

such that no major (adult) social group is excluded;

and a level of civil and political liberties—freedom

of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form
and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the

integrity of political competition and participation

(Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, p.xvi, 1988).
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The inclusion of civil liberties expands on the ideals of

freedom of speech and freedom of expression that Dahl

(1971) included in his criteria of democracy. Freedom to
form and join organizations is an important one as it

creates a competitive political environment that is central
to democracy.
Other authors such as John Wiseman (1990) and David

Brown, Jordin Cohen, Kristian Gleditsch, & et al.

(1998)

define democracy in similar ways. Wiseman (1990) argues

that having a choice on who to vote for as well as a
politically competitive environment is crucial. Also,

regular elections, freedom of speech, and the existence of
a critical opposition must be present in a political system

for it to be considered a democracy. Brown, Cohen,
Gleditsch, & et al.

(1998) state that democracy generally

refers to a system that encourages inclusion,

participation, open competition, and institutionalized
constraints. The constraints are designed to help prevent
those in power from exploiting their 'positions and

corrupting the political system. This is the first
definition that has included a requirement of restraining
the political power of those in office. A nation that wants
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to be democratic must protect its government from

corruption.
David Beetham (1994) defines democracy as a group of

people who collectively make decisions and establish a

system of institutions and procedures that help these
decisions become realized. He notes that the focus on

democracy tends to be on the existence of fair and free
political elections that are competitive between multiple

parties. Akwasi Aidoo (1993) also argues that a country
needs to have a multiparty political system as one of the

requirements for democracy. However, Beetham (1994) notes
that it is important to realize that multipartyism is not a
means to democracy in itself and ruling parties need to be

held accountable for their actions to their electorate. The
presence of multipartyism should not be used as the sole

example of why a country is a democracy. If elections are
fraudulent, it does not matter how many legal political

parties there are, it is not democracy.
From this examination of debates of scholars about
democracy, although not all agree with each other, it is

possible to generate a general definition of democracy.
Democracy is a system of government that has regular

elections that are competitive, fair, and free. In
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addition, it must be a multiparty political system that

elects its leaders based on the votes from its citizens.
The citizens of the country must have certain civil

liberties including freedom of assembly, organization, and
speech. Moreover, voters must be protected from being
pressured to vote for a particular party. Also, the
government must have institutionalized restrictions against
the ruling party to prevent it from exploiting its

political power. These are all aspects of democracy that

were examined in previous definitions of democracy. Also,
the presence of a critical and uncensored media to which

all parties have equal access is essential. An independent

media acts as a self-check on a country's government and

will work as. an anti-corruption measure. In addition, it

serves as a way for the population to become familiar and
knowledgeable with different political actors and issues.

Finally, it must promote an atmosphere within the country

that allows equal economic and social opportunities for its
citizens.

Democracy in Africa
Establishing democracy in Africa has been difficult
for almost every nation on the continent that has attempted
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it. In order to understand why democracy has been such a

challenge to establish and maintain in Africa, it is
necessary to account for the broad effects of European

colonization. Aime Cesaire (1972) wrote about how the

European powers in their attempts to "modernize" the people

'of Africa disrupted their natural cultural progress. He
argues that Europe through colonization, destroyed the

African way of life including their culture, means of
supporting themselves, and disturbed the future of the
whole continent. So in fact, colonization did not modernize

any African society, but set it back. Frantz Fanon (1963)
also addressed this issue, but with more focus on the

effects of colonization on the cultural fabric of African

people.
Colonial domination, because it is total and tends to

oversimplify, very soon manages to disrupt in
spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered

people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by
the negation of national reality, by new legal

relations introduced by the occupying power, by the

banishment of the natives and their customs to
outlying districts by colonial society, by
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expropriation, and by the systematic enslaving of men
and women (Fanon, p. 236, 1963).

In this sense, independence granted upon a former colonial

territory did little to set any country up for a successful
future. While colonization may have established

infrastructure and setup a bureaucratic system in some
African nations, it did more harm than good. The people of
the former colonies and its institutions must undergo a

process of decolonization in order to create their own
identify and forge their own path. In many African
countries, however, the process of decolonization was never
fully realized. Thus, democracy faces serious obstacles in

Africa.
One of the major debates surrounding African democracy

is the question of whether it is different than Western

democracy. Claude. Ake (1993) argues that it has to be
different from Western democracy given the history and

culture of the continent. He suggests that Africa exists in
a state that is largely pre-industrial, with the majority

of people relying on agricultural means for subsistence.
Also, African culture historically views family and the

community as more important than the individual. In this
communal type of setting, he purports that the traditional
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Western method of democracy does not adapt efficiently.
Moreover, it makes the pursuit of individual goals less

important to the African people. Reason Wafawarova (2008)
also argues that Africa7 s social and political framework is

vastly different than in the United States and Western

Europe where a premium is placed on the pursuit of
individual growth and success.
Another tenet of this debate is whether African

democracies should be held to the same standard as Western
democracies. Keith Richburg (2008) argues that it should be
for a few reasons. The international community has allowed
one-party states to rise in many African countries over the

last few decades. He believes this is because these
governments create a "stable" environment where violence
has been minimized. The international community will often

look the other way on civil and human rights violations, if

there is no blatant violence within the country. However,

this style of government even if it provides a level of
stability has no accountability to its people for economic
opportunities and human rights.

Wafawarova (2008), on the other hand, believes Africa
should not be subjected to the same standards as Western

democracy. The process of creating a nation-state within
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boundaries dictated by European powers has been extremely

difficult. He believes that every geographical region has
its own version of democracy and that a one size fits all

mentality will cause democracy to fail in places other than

the West. Wafawarova (2008) also states that on a continent
where poverty is a very real threat, the guarantee of food,

land, and shelter needs to be prioritized compared to the
rights of association and expression. In these places,
democracy is connected with economic livelihoods just as

much as political freedoms.

Another problem with democracy is the popular Western
notion that it is established in a systemic and linear
fashion. Emeka Nwokedi (1995) examines the democratization

process and argues against it being a linear process.
Theoretically, it is easy to view the onset of democracy

occurring in stages, but in reality it rarely occurs so

cleanly. The "development" 2 of democracy could easily

stagnate and regress until the actors inside of a country
determine that they want to pursue democratization again.

This process does not diminish the legitimacy of a

2 I am aware of the economic connotations that the term "development"
has in Africa. However, in this sense, it is purely meant to describe
the evolution or progression of democracy from the African people
themselves.
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democracy in a country, but rather reinforces it. It is

easy for those in Western democracies to forget the

struggles of their own countries to establish democracy and
assume that their development of democracy was a relatively
smooth process. With this mindset, when an African

democracy does not meet the same standards as a Western
democracy, it is easy to write it off as a "failed state"

instead of existing within the natural evolution of
democracy.

Culture has a large part in determining the success of
a democracy. W.I. Jennings (1963) discusses some of the

fundamental issues surrounding the development of democracy

in- Africa. The major difficulty for Jennings is the process

of establishing democracy and its ideals in a culture. He

argues that "democracy has succeeded in North-Western
Europe and in a few countries outside Europe because it has

become entwined in the traditions of the people" (Jennings,
p.68, 1963). This is a long process and can be derailed if
a country experiences dictatorship, economic breakdown, and

poor social conditions. Bratton & Mattes (2007) also state
the importance of institutionalizing democracy. It takes

time for a group of people to accumulate institutional

knowledge about democracy and how it works. Institutional
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knowledge represents the beliefs, skills, and values
developed by a group of people while interacting with
specific institutions. In order for a democracy to be

successful the people, government, and political
institutions have' to believe it to be the right government
and this can take time.

Wiseman (1990) further discusses some of the major
obstacles that democracy faces in Africa. The current
nation-states in Africa were drawn up by European powers

during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. This process

divided the continent into territories that were convenient
to European powers and did not take into account the

reality on the ground. Territories were drawn up based on
European desires, economic interests, and policies. The
governments of African countries must now attempt to create

nations out of groups of people with different cultures,
historical experiences, and languages. Wiseman (1990)

further states that African countries tend to be

economically underdeveloped, poverty is a prevalent
problem, and African standards of living tend to be ranked

low. Moreover, mass education continues to be a problem in

many African countries. Even though a small number of
students in most African countries receive a university
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education, this dream is not realized for the majority of
African students.

African democracy'is certainly different than Western

democracy. Institutionalizing democracy is a difficult,
long process and it is hard to imagine people in Africa

accepting democracy whole-heartedly until they see proof
that it works in their nations. This proof can only be

evidenced over time- as regimes change, politicians are held

accountable, and the general standard of living increases.
The first Western democracies were not compared and held to

some outside standard of performance because they were the
first countries to implement a democratic system in modern

nation-states. African democracies should be viewed
similarly as they are being implemented on a new continent

with a different culture and history. As noted, these new
democracies have to overcome the legacies of their colonial

occupations, which is no easy task. This is not to say that
African politicians should not be held accountable for

their actions. Each nation has a responsibility to hold its
politicians responsible via its constitution and
appropriate legislation. However, the successful

democratization of an African nation will be a long-term
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process and will experience setbacks and should be
appropriately measured in such terms.

Senegal

This thesis seeks to analyze why democracy in Senegal
has been successful and advanced to its current position.

Certainly Senegal has faced serious challenges to its
democracy. Scholars argue that one of main issues facing

Senegal is the need to overcome its history of French

colonialism. From a political standpoint, Sheldon Gellar
(2005) argues that since the French colonial authority
ruled Senegal as an authoritarian state that it gave rise

to a one-party state after independence. The highly

autocratic colonial system implemented by the French
pressured Senegalese politicians to adopt French
institutions of governance. Also, post-independence Senegal
was led by Leopold Sedar Senghor, who was French-educated
and encouraged close ties with France even after

independence. Basil Davidson (1992) argues that the
acceptance of French institutions as a means to govern was
extremely problematic for African societies. Party politics

had not been defined and established in Senegal, which were

crucial to having a smooth transition to an effective,
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multiparty political system. Instead, Senghor was able to
gain control of the government and essentially turn Senegal

into a one-party state.
Mohamed Mbodj

(1993) explores the influence of French

colonialism on the economy of Senegal. The French emphasis
on growth and production of the groundnut industry left
behind an export-based economy that was inefficient and at
the mercy of the world market price for groundnuts.

Frangois Boye (1993) expands further on this investigation
and examines the Senegalese economy since independence. He

finds that Senegal has failed to follow any significant
school of economic thought to stimulate growth and has

relied heavily on international sources to pay its debts.
Thus it has continued to be at the mercy of Western

countries' interests. Nonetheless, Senegal managed to

transition to a democracy.
This thesis examines the reasons how and why democracy

developed in Senegal. Through such an examination, it will
be evident that democracy can succeed in Africa, but it is

a difficult process. Senegal's uniqueness as a former

French colony cannot be denied." It endured colonialism,
maneuvered its way through independence and evolved into a

democracy. This occurred through the efforts of the
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Senegalese people and political opposition, whose actions
led to the erosion of obstacles that were preventing the

country from becoming democratic. This forced Senghor,

Diouf, and other members of the Parti Socialiste du Senegal
(PS) to make democratic concessions to the political

opposition. This process began in 1976, when Senghor

introduced limited multiparty politics and was realized in
1981- when Abdou Diouf removed the last restraints on a full

multiparty political system. It.was during this time that
democracy began to take root in Senegal.

Limitations of the Study
There are limitations in the study that need to be

addressed. As it stands, the research done for this thesis
comes heavily from secondary sources: academic

publications, journal and newspaper articles, and area
studies. The small sampling of primary sources can allow
for misinterpretation of the reality on the ground in

Senegal. This is complicated by the fact that none of the
research for the thesis was done first-hand within the

country of Senegal. Therefore, it was important to find

multiple sources giving the same information in order to

verify reliability.
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Another limitation has been the amount of scholarly
work focusing on Senegal's democracy. Although there is a
healthy amount that has been published on the subject, it
is small compared to the literature published on a country

like South Africa. A large amount of the literature
focusing on Senegal refers to religion and how it
influences other parts of society (Clark, 1999; O'Brien,

1971; O'Brien, 1975; Searing, 2002; and Villalon, 1999). I

have declined to include religion and its effects on
democracy in Senegal to a great extent, as that is
something that needs to be addressed in a larger study.

These things have limited the thoroughness in which the

thesis can examine the events in Senegal to some degree.
Another limitation is the limited scope of the

analysis. Following the democratic progress of a country is

an extremely difficult task as it takes place over many
years. The goal is that by examining a small segment of

Senegal's history, it will show key points when democracy
was able to develop. The analysis of how a democracy is

established and progresses is a difficult task in any

scenario. In order to do this, .1 have focused on studying
the French colonization, key political events during

Senegal's process of decolonization, the consequences of
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these events, and how the democratic process shifted in

response to these events.

Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis will be organized into

three separate chapters. Chapter two will outline the
historical background of French colonialism in. Senegal
starting with its assimilation policies in the early part

of the twentieth century. It will cover much of Senegal's
political history until independence on August 20, 1959.

Chapter three will analyze how Senegal's political
environment changed from’ independence up until the early

1980s. The focus of the chapter will be to examine the
period from 1976 to 1981 in Senegal, when multipartyism was

established. This five year period saw the beginning and

birth of a political environment in which democracy was
able to take root and begin its development. Chapter four
will conclude the thesis by examining the political events

in Senegal following 1981 and how democracy has fared since
multipartyism was established. This chapter will also

include a summary of the thesis, recommendations derived
from the study, and the implications for future research on
Senegal.
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CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

French Influence in Senegal
The style of government that a nation has does not

just develop by accident. It is a result of the historical
experiences of the culture and people that live within the
nation. In order to understand how democracy has developed
and been established in Senegal, it is necessary to analyze

what has influenced Senegal’ and its political system. This

analysis will focus on the time period from 1900 until
independence on August 20, 1959. This historical background

will provide knowledge on the influences that affected
Senegal leading up to independence. It will show the
uniqueness of the development of Senegalese politics and
the political actors responsible for running Senegal post

independence .

Senegal is located on the western coast of Africa and
is roughly 76,000 square miles in size. Most of Senegal's
major cities, both historically and present-day, have been
port cities due to its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean
(Ross, 2008). It is surrounded by Mauritania to the north,

Mali to the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the
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south. Also, Senegal almost completely surrounds The Gambia
besides its small coast on the Atlantic Ocean. Senegal lies

in the Sahelo-Sudanic zone, which is a bioclimatic,

semiarid region that stretches across Africa south of the

Sahara desert. It is a relatively flat country with the
highest elevation being only 1,906 feet in the Bassari

Hills of the southeast (Ross, 2008). As a result of this,
it made for an easy launching point for European settlers.

In addition, in the northern part of the country runs the

Senegal River from which the country derives its name.
Starting with the French Revolution in 1789,

democratic ideals and values were espoused as central to
the French way of thinking. The French enlightenment belief

that all people who were exposed to the proper culture and
education would become rational, sovereign individuals was
professed by French bureaucrats and philosophers. Senegal

is unique because it has a long history of liberal and
democratic practices. As early as 1848, certain areas of

Senegal enjoyed voting rights (Grovogui & Hayward, 1987).
Also, Senegal was the first of France's African colonies

and served as a gateway to the interior of the continent.
It is also unique because it experienced both French

policies of colonial rule: direct rule during assimilation
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as well as the indirect method of rule called association
(Johnson, 1971).
The French administration of Senegal appeared to

reflect this during the early stages of their colonial
rule. This policy was known as assimilation, where the

French believed that it was their mission to assimilate the
Senegalese people into French society and standards

(Gellar, 2005). This appeared to be based in French
enlightenment beliefs and French officials were quick to
promote their desire to help "modernize" their African

brothers. However, assimilation and the justification
behind it had much deeper roots fixated in European

superiority and racism.
The separation between the official French policy of

assimilation and the reality on the ground existed
throughout the entirety of the French colonization of

Senegal. One of the true goals of assimilation was to

replace Senegalese culture with French culture (Lewis,
2000). The French believed that their culture was superior
to the Senegalese and that was .what had allowed them to
colonize Senegal in the first place. In this sense,

assimilation was a policy that would accomplish the goal of
including Senegal into a greater French empire, but also
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create a new population of "Frenchmen" out of the Africans
(Lewis, 2000).
The French policy of assimilation went into full

effect by the start of the twentieth century. France

designated Dakar, Goree, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis in
Senegal as communes. This gave the four areas the same
political status as a French metropolitan area. The
citizens living in the Four Communes did enjoy some

benefits to their location. They had the right to form
political associations, run for office, and vote (Johnson,
1971). Senegalese living outside of the communes, who were
known as indigenes were granted no such rights and could
only become citizens by meeting a rigorous set of standards

(Gilbert & Reynolds., 2008) . Moreover, indigenes were
subject to a special law code known as the indigenat. This
law allowed French colonialists to punish non-citizen

Senegalese without due process and levy hefty fines and
punishments on the indigenes (Gilbert & Reynolds, 2008).
For the Senegalese living in the communes, the only

political difference according to assimilation policy was

that these Senegalese lived outside of France and in a
French territory. Each commune had a municipal council that
was elected by the citizens of the city, and the mayor and
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his staff was selected from members of the council
(Johnson, 1971). Although it was the duty of the mayor to

perform French administration mandates, the mayor held
several powers in his own right. The mayor made independent

decisions regarding local taxes, public health, law
enforcement, and other important matters that affected the
commune.

However, many Senegalese were not happy with
assimilation even those living in the communes. Senegal's

first political group was formed in 1912 in protest. They
were the Jeunes Senegalais, or Young Senegalese (Johnson,
1971). This group advocated for better standards of living
for Africans including better jobs, salaries, cost-of-

living- benefits, educational facilities, and scholarships
to study at French institutions. The Young Senegalese

proceeded to endorse and campaign for Blaise Diagne, a
young African who would go on to win the 1914 deputy

election and become the first African to serve in the
French Parliament. Diagne was educated in France and

Senegal and served 22 years overseas as a French customs
agent before entering politics (Clark & Phillips, 1994).
This came as a major shock to the French colonial
administration. A native Senegalese man had won the

23

deputyship election and it made the French rethink their
colonial policy. The idea of Africans, even if they were

assimilated being able to vote one of their own politicians

into the French parliament terrified the French (Burns &
Collins, 2007).
This fear along with the events during World War I

caused assimilation to fall out of favor as a colonial
policy. Several thousand Senegalese had been conscripted to

fight for France during World War I (Suret-Cariale, 1971).
These soldiers were known as tirailleurs senegalais and

many were killed in battle, creating hostility from the
families of these soldiers towards the French. In addition,

assimilation was viewed as unrealistic by French
administrators, who had experienced the high monetary cost

of the policy. High tensions from World War I and the large

number of French bureaucrats in Senegal that assimilation
required began to take its toll. The goal of creating
Frenchmen out of Africans was failing. By 1922, only 100

indigenes in all of French West Africa had become citizens

(Gilbert & Reynolds, 2008). Assimilation became heavily

criticized from within France and a new policy known as
association was embraced by the colonial administration.
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Association
Association was proclaimed by French officials as

endorsing a mutual respect for the cultures of both parties

involved, whereas assimilation had sought to remove African
culture and customs (Suret-Canale, 1971). In reality

though, the policy of association was seen as a veiled

theory of races. Author Jean Suret-Canale (1971) states

that "this pretended 'association', linked to maintenance
of the 'rights of domination', was nothing but the

association of the horse with its. rider..." (p. 85) .
Association was first legitimately discussed as a
replacement for assimilation by Jules Harmand. In Harmand's

Domination et colonisation (1910), he portrayed association
to be a colonial system that allowed the conqueror to

benefit economically from a territory while maintaining
control through the native people's institutions (Betts,

1961). However, since the French had already dismantled
much of the pre-colonial structure of Senegalese society,

this was a difficult task.
Association was inspired by the British colonial

system of indirect rule. Several former French
administrators in Africa, including the notable former

governor-general of Senegal Louis Faidherbe, realized that
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millions of Africans were not going to be turned into

Frenchmen. As a result, French officials who were

proponents of association protested against transferring

French institutions to Senegal. As mentioned, the
Senegalese people were not satisfied with assimilation on
any level. Many Africans who studied to teach were given
the least desirable positions and lowest pay. Urban schools

were built in the neighborhoods of the French and were

expected to accept all French and Creole students, leaving
African students with the regional schools that did not
offer the same level of instruction (Johnson, 1971).

Ultimately, the French preferred to use the Senegalese as

proxies that they could manipulate rather than Western
educated Senegalese, who were aware of things like freedom,
democracy, and equal human rights (Gellar, 2005).

French association did differ from British indirect

rule in several waysIt was not unusual for British
administrators and native authorities to coexist in

Britain's African colonies. This was not the case in French
colonies since association was viewed as being direct rule

through Senegalese proxies (Johnson, 1971). This scenario
is best explained by Burns & Collins (2007):
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Many French officials believed, however, that
association was little more than assimilation
disguised by a cloak of hypocrisy in which it was
wrapped. French officials continued to maintain

complete control of the administration of their

colonies unchecked by the chiefs, who had been
converted into convenient petty officers rather than
representatives of their people. French administrators

had no illusions about this contradiction but were
quite content to ignore it in order to replace African

customs, for which they had little more than contempt,
with the relentless dissemination of the French
language and culture (p; 303). '
French colonialism was met with strong resistance from

African intellectuals internationally. Martinican poet Aime

Cesaire, future Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor,
and Guianan Leon Damas created the Negritude movement in
the 1930s. Negritude represented a black African

consciousness and an embrace of native African culture

(Hymans, 1971). The preservation and celebration of an
African's background, culture, future, and humanism were at

the heart of the Negritude movement (Hymans, 1971) .. A non-

dogmatic type of socialism, Senghor envisioned Negritude as
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unique blend of European and African values (Cox & Kessler,

1980). Senghor even advised an "Assimilate, don't be

Assimilated" policy starting in 1937. His goal was for the
Senegalese to remain Senegalese, while taking what benefits

-they could from the French and European culture (Hymans,
1971). Frantz Fanon (1963) states that Senegalese
nationalists said this of Senghor: "'We have demanded that
the higher posts should be given to Africans; and now

Senghor is Africanizing the Europeans'" (p. 46). Senghor
and Negritude attempted to turn French colonial policies on
its head and use them for the benefit of Africans.

The first sign of a shift away from traditional French

colonial policy came during World War II. On January 20,
1944, a conference in Brazzaville, Congo was held to

discuss the future of French colonialist policies in Africa
(Mortimer, 1969). Charles De Gaulle presided over the
conference, which sought to establish a method in which a

French Community could be established that included the
colonies in Africa (Mortimer, 1969) . This policy shift came

about for a few reasons. First, the countries that had lost
World War I had been stripped of their colonial territories
and France was currently occupied by Germany. Also,

Germany's invasion of France in 1940 and France's call for
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help from its colonial territories has damaged its aura of

invincibility among French African colonies:

...the realization that she(France) actually needed
their help, that they were no longer being lectured
like children but appealed to as brothers, was clearly

going to make it difficult to retain an authoritarian

system of government after the peace" (Mortimer, p.
29, 1969).

In fact, the capital of Free France was located in Africa

during the German occupation of France during World War II
(Mortimer, 1969).
When the Allied powers defeated Nazi Germany to end

World War II, it was apparent that France would no longer
be able to continue its colonial policies. This was due to
the widespread knowledge of the atrocities committed by

Germany against racial minorities in Europe during the war.
The Allied victory legitimized the belief that racial

policies were not humane and would not be tolerated. France
could no longer govern Senegal on the basis that Africans

and Europeans were inherently different (Gellar, 2005). The

French also had enlisted thousands more tirailleurs

senegalais to fight during World War II. The gratitude of
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the French for Senegalese military service was epitomized

in Tiaroye, Senegal in November 1944 (Mortimer, 1969) .

Tirailleurs senegalais who had been German captives
during the war had been repatriated to a camp in Tiaroye.

These soldiers were promised that they would be paid

arrears for their service. However, payment never came and
the French ordered the former soldiers to board vehicles

headed to Bamako, Mali. When the tirailleurs senegalais

refused, it was declared a mutiny and the French opened

fire. Nearly 40 soldiers were killed and the same number
injured. Some of the surviving soldiers were sentenced to

10 years imprisonment by a Dakar military tribunal in 1945
(Mortimer, 1969). No apology was made by French

authorities, infuriating the Senegalese .population. This
event represented an indictment of the entire French
colonial system. It represented the reality about French

colonialism that from the French perspective, the
Senegalese were not Frenchmen but French subjects and they
were expendable.

French colonial policy shifted on October 28, 1946,
the date of the signing of the constitution of the Fourth

French Republic. The preamble of the constitution stated

that colonial territories, overseas protectorates, and
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France would all be a single entity under a new French
Union (Gellar, 2005). The French Union was to share the

same liberties, rights and democratic ideals regardless of
location, race, and religion. Originally, the African

colonies had pushed for a federation, but this had been
rejected out of French fear that it would make France a

colony of her colonies. However, Senegal and other African

nations joined the French Union on the belief that they
would be treated as associates and political apprentices
(Skurnik, 1972). This had a profound effect on Senegal

immediately as the Senegalese people became involved in the
politics of their country on a new level.

The Emergence of Senegalese Politics

Lamine Gueye and his Socialist Party, the Parti
Senegalais d'action Socialiste (PSAS) gained political

control of Senegal immediately following the war due to
their popularity in the Four Communes. Gueye was well-knownin Senegal as he had been elected deputy to the French
parliament in 1945 and had passed two "Loi's"3 improving
Senegalese rights by the end of World War II (Schaffer,

3 A Lol is a law that is passed in the French parliament (Schaffer,
1998).
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1998). However, when voting rights were extended to all

Senegalese citizens in June 1956 with the passing of the

Loi-Cadref the PSAS had a difficult time attracting new

voters. The Loi-Cadre established several important things

in Senegal. First, it required universal suffrage in
Senegal. It also had a mandate that created the Senegalese

National Assembly, a unicameral legislative body for the
country. Next, regional assemblies in Senegal would receive

additional responsibilities including taking over
government services previously offered by the French Union
(Skurnik, 1972). France was gradually removing its direct

control over Senegal, but still wanted it to remain as part
of the French empire.

Most new voters were drawn to a new party, known as
the Bloc Democratique Senegalais (BDS), formed in 1948

(Schaffer, 1998). The BDS was led by Leopold Sedar Senghor,
who was a famous poet and was popular among the Senegalese

people, and Mamadou Dia. Senghor, like Gueye, was a deputy
in the French parliament, elected in 1945. He had been

educated in Senegal and later France during the 1930s.

Senghor had also been a prisoner of war from 1940 to 1942
while fighting for France in World War II (Clark &
Phillips, 1994). In March 1957, the BDS won 47 of the
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available 60 seats in the Senegalese National Assembly
elections (Roche, 2001). Many rural voters had been drawn
to Senghor's Negritude, which emphasized the importance of
community and religion (Clark & Phillips, 1994). The
convincing political defeat persuaded Gueye and the PSAS to
join with the BDS (Beck, 2008). This created a dominant

political party led by Senghor known as the Union

Progressists Senegalaise (UPS) in early 1958.
The UPS was now faced with a population that had grown

increasingly nationalistic and was calling for freedom from
France. Independence and self-governance was seen as an

inalienable right and many Senegalese were anxious to break
away from France. Senghor, who was still serving in the

French parliament, was selected for the Consultative

Constitutional Committee (CCC) .(Skurnik, 1972). The CCC was

charged with writing the portion of the new French
constitution that dealt with French overseas territories.
Senghor's main goal while being on the CCC was for the new
constitution to allow Africans the option of choosing

independence within a five year period. Senghor's efforts

were rewarded when on September 28, 1958; France presented
Senegal and the rest of newly renamed French Community

(formerly the French Union) with a referendum that gave
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each territory three options: integration into a greater

French republic, independence, or self-government within
the French Community (Beck, 2008).

While the Senghor-led UPS controlled the Senegalese
legislature, there were other strong political groups
involved with this decision. The Parti Africain de

1'Independance (PAI), a Marxist group, and the Parti du

Regroupement Africain-Senegal (PRA-S) were the primary

opposition groups (Beck, 2008). The PRA-S was formed by a
group of radical idealists who wanted immediate
independence from French control. However, the UPS feared

that immediate independence would cause groups like the
PRA-S to rise up and attempt to seize control of the
country. There was a group of people in the UPS known as

the "young Turks" who advocated strongly for independence

as well (Hymans, 1971). Senghor was determined to maintain

close ties with France for the economic benefit of Senegal.
Therefore, Senghor and the UPS campaigned for self

governance within the French Community to help preserve

their control of Senegal and stay in France's good graces.

Senghor's influence and popularity among the Senegalese
population was evident as 97 percent of Senegal voted for
the same option the UPS desired (Beck, 2008).
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Senghor's philosophy on governance was based in the

belief that Africa's best path to modernization lay in a
close economic and political union with Europe. Senghor had
remained hesitant to publically support any notion of true
independence from France. Senghor biographer Jacques Hymans

(1971) states, "Throughout his political career Senghor had

proceeded with caution, only supporting what seemed
acceptable to France" (p. 174). However, the political

landscape had shifted in Africa and by 1958; the continent
had grown increasingly nationalistic. In order to protect

himself and the power of the UPS, Senghor was careful to

advocate any path that distanced Senegal to far from
France. Senghor still believed that for Senegal to develop,

it must maintain close ties with France.

Shortly after Senegal's vote, Senghor approached
Dahomey (present-day Benin), Upper Volta (present-day

Burkina Faso), and Soudan (present-day Mali) in October
1958 about creating a regional federation within the French

Community (Kurtz, 1970). This was viewed as a threat by
other countries in the region and by French citizens living

in West Africa, as it would have created a regional power
greater than any individual country. Due to pressure from

France and other countries in West Africa, Dahomey and
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Upper Volta opted out of creating a regional federation

(Kurtz, 1970). However, in March 1959, Senegal and Soudan
approved a constitution that created the Mali Federation.
In July 1959, political leaders from the Mali Federation
requested independence from France and French President

Charles de Gaulle granted their request (Kurtz, 1970).

President de Gaulle was partial to granting former colonies
independence because he was focused on building a strong

France after the collapse of the Fourth Republic.
The Mali Federation was short lived and by August

1959, it was clear there were serious political
disagreements within the government. Senghor, serving as

vice president, felt that Senegal would be taken advantage

of since he was not the president of the Mali Federation

(Kurtz, 1970). He had received little support from Soudan
citizens in his bid for president. The Mali Federation was
led by Modibo Keita, who was from Soudan. These tensions

erupted on August 19, 1959, when Senegal and Soudan

mobilized their respective militaries in an attempt to

protect their own territory (Clark & Phillips, 1994). The
Senegalese military outmaneuvered the Soudanese military

and captured and exiled its leaders to Soudan. Dia then
called a midnight session of the Senegalese National
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Assembly and on August 20, 1959, Senegal declared its
independence from the Mali Federation. France quickly

recognized both Senegal and Soudan (renamed the Mali
Republic) as independent countries (Kurtz, 1970). Although
the Mali Federation had been a failure, Senegal gained its

independence and its new statehood with Senghor selected as
president and Mamadou Dia as prime minister.

Senegal had endured the trials of French colonialism
and gradually won its freedom from French control. Senghor
and the UPS had emerged as the dominant political force in

Senegal. The Senegalese people were filled with ambition
and hope with their newfound independence. Certain

democratic institutions were already in place such as the
ability to vote, the presence of political parties, and a
National Assembly.

However, Senegal would quickly be

confronted with some of the challenges that democracy faces
in Africa as the Senghor-led UPS would move quickly to try
to consolidate political power and control Senegal in a
one-party state.
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CHAPTER THREE

POST-INDEPENDENCE SENEGAL

Adam Przeworski (1986) discusses four reasons why

authoritarian regimes can collapse. First, the regime has
accomplished whatever goal that led to its establishment.

This warrants the regime obsolete and it collapses. Second,
the regime loses its legitimacy for any number of reasons
and disintegrates. Third, conflicts between individuals or

groups within the regime break out and cannot be resolved.

Some members reach for outside support causing the regime
to splinter and fall apart. Finally, outside pressures
calling for democracy force the authoritarian regime to
compromise its power and eventually lead to its downfall.

There is substantial evidence that a combination of

these effects were coming into play in Senegal during the
1960s and 1970s. The population was unhappy with the

government's role in running the country. Economically,

politically, and socially; the people of Senegal felt
disenfranchised and disempowered. It became evident that

something needed to be done in order for the UPS to remain

in control and to rebuild some of its reputation around the
country. These factors created enormous pressure on Senghor
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to make some political changes. He finally did this in

1976, when he had the constitution amended to create a

limited multiparty political system in an attempt to
diffuse the pressures facing his administration.
Prior to this, the UPS had remained a strong political

force following independence in Senegal. In the National

Assembly elections of April 1959, the UPS had won every
single legislative seat in the new government (Beck, 2008).
However, the UPS was soon challenged in September 1961,

when the Bloc des Masses Senegalaises (BMS), a conservative

party was formed. The BMS quickly gained a substantial

following as it was comprised of older socialists that had
important family connections around Senegal. Senghor knew
the BMS represented a substantial threat to the UPS and
began attempts to remove the BMS from political

competition. Senghor attempted to coerce the BMS leaders to
join the UPS, but this strategy failed as the Secretary-

General Cheikh Anta Diop declined. Diop was a trained
historian who had been educated in both Dakar and Paris

(Clark & Phillips, 1994). He. was highly critical of Senghor
and the UPS. In retaliation, Senghor had Diop imprisoned in

an effort to dissolve the BMS party (Grovogui & Hayward,

1987) .
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Diop's imprisonment caused a split in the BMS with
half of the group remaining loyal to Diop and the other
half accepting the UPS offer to combine parties. The UPS

absorbed the willing half of the BMS and disbanded the
remainder of the party on October 14, 1963. The BMS party
was no more. This became a popular tactic of Senghor, who

absorbed eight of the 21 political groups that formed

between 1948 and 1966 into the UPS (Grovogui & Hayward,
1987). However, the remainder of the disbanded BMS party

refused to surrender and soon formed the Front National
Senegalais (FNS) with Diop as their Secretary-General when
he was released from prison. Like the BMS, the popularity

of the group grew quickly, .due to its members, but it was
permanently banned in 1965 (Clark & Phillips, 1994). The
reason for its removal was given in a statement by Senghor

in which he claimed to support the plurality-of the
political system, but would not allow the presence of
subversive and violent groups (Grovogui & Hayward, 1987).
The legal Senegalese opposition was basically eliminated

during this time either by being outlawed or by being
absorbed by Senghor and his party.
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Problems with the Union Progressists Senegalaise
Despite their political success, the UPS began to
experience some internal conflict. Senghor's philosophy
differed from Mamadou Dia's on many topics (Le Vine, 1967).
Dia had worked with Senghor since after World War II and

before that had been an economist, journalist, and teacher.
In 1961, Dia created the Office de Commercialization
Agricole (OCA), which created cooperatives between rural

groundnut farmers. This alienated many European businessmen
who had acted as merchants for groundnut farmers in the

rural part of Senegal and supported Senghor. As a result of
these activities, he was known as a vigorous administrator
(Clark & Phillips, 1994). Dia also suggested that Islamic
marabouts4, who had acted as vote-getters for Senghor in the

villages, remove themselves from politics and focus on

spiritual guidance. These policies alienated Dia from
Senghor, who began to see Dia as a threat to his power.
This conflict culminated in 1962 when a motion of censure
4 For more information on the marabouts and their influence on Senegal,
please, see O'Brien, D.B.C. (1971). Mourides of Senegal: The Political &
Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood. London: Oxford
University Press, O'Brien, D.B.C. (1975). Saints & Politicians: Essays
in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society. London: Cambridge
University Press, and Searing, J.F. (2002). "God Alone is King": Islam
and Emancipation in Senegal. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
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was entered into the National Assembly against Dia (Beck,

2008). Dia responded by having four of the UPS deputies
that were leading the campaign to oust him arrested. The
army was called in and surrounded the Assembly building and

arrested Dia as he tried to leave. Dia was charged with an
attempted coup d'etat and sentenced to life imprisonment

(Beck, 2008). He was eventually released from prison in
1974 .
This event struck a blow against the prospects of
democracy in Senegal. Senegal adopted a new constitution in

March 1963 that changed Senegal from a parliamentary state

to a centralized presidential system (Beck, 2008). This
constitution eliminated the post of prime minister and had

a specific article that gave the president enormous control
over the government's operations. In other words, Senghor

removed the only other political position that could

challenge his authority and gained the right to rule
Senegal individually. In addition, elections were now in
the form of a winner-take-all system. Government ministers

deferred to Senghor's authority on all important decisions
and the National Assembly approved any legislation

introduced by the president (Beck, 2008) .
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Moreover, independent media began to disappear at this

time. The only daily newspaper in the country was the non

political Dakar-Ma tin, which was French-owned and run.
Senghor took control of all radio stations and the national

journalist association to ensure that only positive things
were published about him (Gellar, 2005). Foreign newspapers
were subject to censure and seizure if they contained any

information that could be viewed as anti-Senghor. This
infraction on the free media was another example of
Senghor's desire to achieve complete political control of

Senegal.

Senegal as a One-Party State

President Senghor and the UPS now controlled Senegal
in a one-party state (Fatton, 1987). Senghor had fashioned

himself in the role of a chief and considered the
Senegalese people as his villagers. He not only made the
laws, but was above the law itself. He appointed ministers

to see over various aspects of the government, which
allowed him to focus on cultural and foreign affairs

(Fatton, 1987). A side benefit to Senghor's creation of a
large bureaucracy was that it allowed him to avoid dealing
with daily political procedures. As Adamolekun (1971)
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points out, Senghor surrounded himself with a large

bureaucracy as a survival method. He did this to avoid
major criticism from the opposition and the populace, as he
was able to blame his ministers for any shortcomings of the

government. Also, he could claim to critics that the best
minds in the country were addressing each problem

(Adamolekun, 1971).

Senghor's regime was not without any difficulties
however. By the mid-1960s, Senegal was facing serious

problems. Economic growth and prosperity had not occurred
as expected and the Senegalese people were growing

impatient. In 1966, the Office national de cooperation et

d'assistance an developpement (ONCAD) was created to help

implement state control over the rural economy. ONCAD was
designed to help liberate the peasants from their debts

accumulated in the groundnut industry. The groundnut

industry represented nearly 80 percent of the country's
exports and rural employment (Beck, 2008). However, it
ended up being nothing more than a way for the bureaucrats

to extract resources from the rural interior to Dakar
(Fatton, 1987). This problem was magnified when in 1967;

France eliminated all price supports towards Senegal's
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groundnut industry. A severe drought hit Senegal during

this same year compounding the issue.
The drought severely affected peanut exports and even
with the world price of peanuts almost doubling from 1968
to 1973, profits shrunk considerably (Beck, 2008). Smaller

profits, less arable land, and the elimination of French

subsidies led to a large, disgruntled group of farmers who
were unhappy with the government's management of

agriculture. At the same time, urban migration was creating

a large population of unemployed Senegalese in the cities.
The plight of the Senegalese farmers was matched with the

frustrations of the urban working class and university

students. This culminated in riots and strikes in May and

June of 1968 in Dakar (Fatton, 1987). Urban workers
protested in response to low and unpaid salaries; the high

rate of unemployment, and the high price of food (Beck,
2008). Students joined in the protests as they were unhappy

that French culture and methods dominated Senegal's

university system (Fatton, 1987).
The demonstrations and unhappy populace led President

Senghor to take measures to lower food prices and raise pay

(Beck, 2008). These events served as a wakeup call to the
UPS. It forced Senghor to realize that despite his firm
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grasp on the country's political system, he could not

ignore the population's needs. The power of the Senegalese

people was being asserted and the UPS recognized that even
they would not be able to rule the country without the

support of the population. The act of gaining independence
from France had instilled a belief in Senegal that it was

possible to change bad circumstances if people worked
towards at it. The Senegalese people had failed to benefit
from the fruits of independence and decolonization was

moving far too slowly to present economic opportunities

across the country.
Frustrated with Senegalese life, the intellectual

class was driven to try and force some change in Senegalese
politics. In early 1969, a group of civil servants and

intellectuals formed the Club Nation et Developpement
(CND). This organization was founded to organize and give a
voice to the deep unhappiness with the current state of

Senegalese affairs. As Schumacher (1975) points out, the
CND focused on the lack of dynamism in the ruling party,
the need for continued modernization including
constitutional reform, the need to expand political

participation opportunities, and to rejuvenate Senegal's
political class.
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Senghor, who was trying to distance his politics from
the poor conditions of life in Senegal, supported the group

and its work. Senghor claimed that the national government

unloaded the majority of its responsibilities on him and

that.70 percent of the work he had to do could be handled
by ministers. He felt that he was unfairly burdened with

day-to-day politics and was unable to fulfill his role as
the head of the state. Senghor's opinion of the failure of

the Senegalese state was in part supported by the CND, as

some of his cabinet was members in the organization
(Fatton, 1987). Senghor was determined to make
constitutional amendments to force change and did this by

establishing a board of five jurists to draw up all

revisions necessary to improving the government. This was
done in an effort to legitimize the Senghorian regime in
the eyes of the Senegalese people.

The 1970 Constitutional Mandates
On February 22, 1970, the constitutional mandates the

board had decided on were put to a national vote and

passed. The new mandates established the official duties of
the president, which were to determine national policy,

supervise how the policy was carried out by the government,
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and act as the country's arbitrator (Schumacher, 1975).
Moreover, these mandates reestablished the post of prime

minister in the national government. This position was

filled by 35 year old technocrat Abdou Diouf. Diouf had
been educated at the University of Dakar and received a law

degree from the University of Paris. He had previously
served as head of Senghor's private office from 1963 to

1965, secretary general of presidency from 1965 to 1968,
and minister of planning and industry from 1968 to 1970

(Wiseman, 1990).
Due to Diouf's extensive service in positions close to

Senghor, he was well known as Senghor's protege in
political circles (Clark & Phillips, 1994). However, this

was not meant to create a power-sharing agreement between
the president and prime minister, but to decentralize some

of the political requirements on the president and to allow

Senghor to train the next leader of Senegal. In the new
constitution, if the ruling president retired, the prime

minister would gain the presidency until the end of the

former president's elected term (Schumacher, 1975).
In the new Senegalese government, the president could

appoint and dismiss the prime minister as necessary. The
prime minister would appoint the ministers of his cabinet
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as long as the president approved the selections. The prime
minister and his colleagues would be subject to the control

of the National Assembly. The National Assembly was

protected by a new mandate that stated that the legislation
could only be disbanded if a motion of censure was

introduced by a quarter of its members and was passed by an
absolute majority (Schumacher, 1975). It became clear that
the UPS was taking a new approach to governing Senegal.

Diouf appointed several people to the government who had
never held a government post before and were technocratic

in nature like himself.

Senegal as a Limited Multiparty State

Senghor's reforms culminated in March and April of
1976, when the National Assembly voted on revisions that

established a tripartite political system (Fatton, 1987).
The three political parties were designed to represent the

different ideologies of the Senegalese population as

determined by Senghor. The first party was Senghor's party,
the UPS, now renamed as the Parti Socialists du Senegal

(PS). The PS represented the social-democratic ideology.

The Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS), headed by

Abdoulaye Wade, represented the liberal-democratic
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ideology.. It was included due to its presence as the
largest opposition party in Senegal. The constitution also

called for a communist party, which was filled by the PAI
and led by Majhemout Diop. A communist party was included

because the PS believed it would help divide the political
left and silence some of the loudest critics, which
happened to be communist (Fatton, 1987).
The constitution stated that the three legal political

parties had to adhere to these assigned ideologies

(Fatton,

1987). If a party attempted to change its ideology, the
government would have full authority to dissolve the party.

This was done to create a political environment where the
political parties were constantly locked in ideological

conflict with one another. The PS believed that the
*
ideologies

of the political parties represented the

contemporary political beliefs of the Senegalese people.
The rigid guidelines created a large sense of

dissatisfaction in Senegal within the PAI, PDS, and with

other political parties that were not legally recognized by
the constitution.

Senghor and the PS opted to deal with their critics by
bringing them into the political process instead of

oppressing them. Robert Fatton (1987) explains it as such,
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"The formative efforts of the ruling class were rooted in
the need to create a new hegemony capable of legitimizing
the Senghorian state" (p. 63). The PS postulated that

democracy should not be constricted to a single party, but

should not allow for an unlimited number of political
interests either. One party would limit the extent of a

democratic society and an unrestricted number of parties
would lead to chaos. Senghor stated, "We should not
multiply parties. Otherwise, we risk falling into anarchy.

We must build solidly" (Fatton, 1987, p. 19). Eventually in
1979, the Senghorian-led government approved a fourth

political party to fulfill the conservative ideology, the

Mouvement republicain senegalais (MRS)

.(Fatton, 1987)'. Now

the legal political spectrum in Senegal reflected

perspectives from conservatives, liberals, socialists, and
communists.
Linda Beck (1997) argues that Senghor introduced

limited reform in the political system to preserve his own
power. However, it did open up the political system to be
competitive for the first time with legalized

multipartyism. The fact that Senghor and the PS implemented
a liberalization of the political process from above was a

rare event. Robert Fatton (1987) analyzed the time period
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from 1975 to 1985 in Senegal and determined that a "passive

revolution" occurred. This "passive revolution" was self

induced and moved Senegal from a one-party state towards a
liberal democracy. This transition was ignited by the

economic, political, and social pressures facing the
Senghor regime. Although these pressures were not unique to

Senegal, the result of these pressures was, in that Senegal

moved towards a democratic system. One reason is because
Senghor recognized that losing political power was a real

possibility and he decided to make constitutional reforms
in order to appease the population and maintain power.
Not everyone approved of the new political system,

especially those opposition groups who had been made
illegal with the new constitutional amendments. The

Passemblement National Democratique (RND) led by Cheikh
Anta Diop was the most vocal of the unrecognized political
organizations (Fatton, 1987). The RND believed that the

tripartite political system outlined by the constitution
was constricting and would never allow for the entire

Senegalese population's ideologies to be represented
(Fatton, 1987). The RND was supported by several hundred
Senegalese intellectuals who paid for an advertisement to
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run in Le Monde, a daily newspaper, condemning the

government and rejecting the tripartite system.
The intellectuals proclaimed that the political
liberalization was carried out solely to diffuse the social

pressures brought on by a failing agricultural system and a

weak economy (Fatton, 1987). Opposition parties began to
unite in response to Senghor's unwillingness to establish

unlimited multipartyism. In 1978, six unofficial political

parties created the Coordination de 1'opposition senegalais
unie (COSU)

(Fatton, 1987). COSU was designed to protest

limited multipartyism and demand for full democracy. COSU
also became the main source of criticism against Senghor
and accused his regime of being corrupt and neocolonial.
One legal political party, the PDS, supported

Senghor's tripartite system, but disagreed with the method
of selecting the parties. Senghor had created the system
without the input of the National Assembly, which

undermined the Senegalese democratic process (Fatton,
1987). The PDS proposed that the two opposition parties
should be chosen through popular vote to better represent
the views of the populace. It was easy for the PDS to make

this argument as it was a legally protected political

party. By taking this position, the PDS was attempting to.
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make it more attractive to potential, voters. The PDS did
not argue against the limit on the number of legally

recognized political parties, however. Additional political
parties would represent a threat to its status as the major

opposition political party and potentially steal voters
away (Fatton, 1987).
The introduction of multipartyism allowed for

competitive elections to be held for the first time in
1978. Senghor won re-election overwhelmingly with 82

percent of the vote as did the PS in capturing 82 out of
100 seats in the National Assembly. The PDS captured the
other 18 seats and the PAI failed to gain any
representation in the government (Fatton, 1987). However,

this marked development in Senegalese politics as it was
the first time in the country's history that an opposition

party held seats in the National Assembly (Fatton, 1987).

Senghor's decision to create a limited multiparty
political system also allowed the presence of non

government controlled media to reappear. The PDS

established the newspaper La Democrate in 1974 to reflect
its policies and viewpoints (Gellar, 2005). Even political

parties that were not authorized by the central government,
in particular Marxist parties, began publishing their own
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underground newspapers to express their views. Senegal's

first satire newspaper was established in 1977 known as Le

Politicien (Gellar, 2005). However, opposition newspapers
still only reached a small number of citizens mainly living

in the Dakar area and were largely ineffective.

Senegal's Poor Economy
The introduction of limited multipartyism and the move
away from democratic authoritarianism did not have a

positive effect on Senegal's poor economy. Senegal was
still plagued with high food and oil prices, high

inflation, and a decrease in the world market price of its
two biggest exports: groundnuts and phosphates. Senegal

also suffered from a massive drought in the mid-1970s that
wiped out most of the groundnuts crop, adding further

tensions to the economic crisis (Fatton, 1987). A couple of

factors contributed to this poor economic state. First, by
1980, nearly 65 percent of groundnuts were being illegally
smuggled and sold in The Gambia (Boone, 1990). State
control over the groundnuts industry and the important

revenue gained from it had slipped away. Moreover, a
reverse flow of illegal goods such as clothing, cosmetics,

enamelware, shoes, and textiles began flooding into the
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rural areas of the country and into urban markets (Boone,

1990). High cost local manufacturing could not match prices
with these illegal goods leading to a decline in local

production and revenue.
By the end of the 1970s, Senegal's debt reached over
$1 billion United States dollars (USD). In order to deal

with this debt, Senegal entered into an economic plan with

theb International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The
plan recommended by both organizations called for reducing
the balance of payments owed and budgetary deficits,

eliminating inefficient public sector organizations,
reducing government spending, reducing government control
of the economy, and encouraging private sector growth
(Gruhn, 1983).

Senegal attempted to fulfill many of these
recommendations in the hope of receiving emergency loans

from the two organizations. It eliminated subsidies on
bread and sugar, taxed alcohol, kept wages at the rate of

inflation, and raised tariffs on imports (Gruhn, 1983). In
response to these actions, the IMF and World Bank both

granted Senegal loans under their Structural Adjustment
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Programmes (SAP)5 in 1980, but ended up cancelling the
remainder of the loans by 1983 (Gruhn, 1983). The falling

world price of groundnuts and phosphates caused Senegal to

report a 15 percent drop in export earnings rather than the

19 percent increase as projected by the IMF and World Bank
(Gruhn, 1983). Both organizations acknowledged the

difficulties faced by Senegal, but claimed that Senegal had
not responded swiftly enough to these crises to remain
credit-worthy. One of the biggest criticisms was that in

1981 Senegal failed to increase the national public savings
to investment ratio from 15 percent to 25 percent (Gruhn,

1983).
The Senghorian method of running the economy had

failed utterly in the two decades since independence.

Senegal had been nearly bankrupted and was heavily
dependent on France, the IMF, and the World Bank for
funding. This poor economic state combined with the
5 It has been recognized that SAP's have been extremely harmful for
African nations. High debt, high levels of poverty and poor growth
rates have remained consistent in many nations that implemented SAP's.
Senegal is not exempt from this status as well. For more information on
this, please see: African Development Bank Group. (2001). Senegal:
Evaluation of the Structural Adjustment Programme II. Tunis, Tunisia:
Author, Delgado, C.L. & Jammeh S. (Eds.). (1991). The Political Economy
of Senegal under Structural Adjustment. Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, and Naiman, R. & Watkins, N. (1999). A Survey of the
Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social
Spending, and Debt Relief. Washington, DC: Center for Economic and
Policy Research.
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political criticism over Senghor's refusal to grant
unlimited multipartyism creating mounting pressure on the

government. In response, Senghor decided to resign as
president on December 31, 1980. This made Senghor the first

civilian president in post-independence Africa to

voluntarily relinquish his political power (Wiseman, 1990).

Abdou Diouf, who was currently serving as prime minister,
would ascend to the presidency as was dictated by the
Senegalese constitution (Beck, 2008) .

Abdou Diouf as Senegal's President
Upon taking office, President Diouf faced a difficult
political situation. Diouf had become president only

because Senghor has stepped down while in office. Some
forces in Senegal called for the military to take control

of the government and to hold emergency elections to elect

a president. However, the military chose to abide by the

constitution and refused all calls for a coup d'etat

(Fatton, 1987). Additionally, Diouf faced an angry

population who had grown increasingly frustrated with the
state of Senegal's economic affairs. In April 1981, the

Diouf-led National assembly removed all constraints on the

number of political parties
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1987). Diouf did this to silence any critics who might

attack him for the Senghorian legacy of limited
multipartyism. Diouf also believed that it would help him
evade political pressure from the population of Senegal
from the poor economic and social environment of the

country.
The legalization of all political parties was a shrewd

political move by Diouf and the PS. While it did remove
restrictions on Senegal's political process, which

undoubtedly made Senegal more open and democratic, it also
had some benefits for the PS. Coalitions such as COSU were

rendered useless now that all of the members were now legal
political parties. By early 1982, there were 14 recognized
opposition parties (Beck, 2008). The opposition including

COSU, having lost their reason of unification, which was
the goal of being granted unlimited multipartyism, was

divided against one another. The former COSU members as
well as the PAI and PDS attempted to stay unified by

signing the plate-forme d'unite d'action des partis de
1'opposition in 1983 (Fatton, 1987). This document
identified the PS and Senghor regime as the source of

economic and social crises facing Senegal and called for a
new program of national renewal. However, nothing ever grew
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from this document and the opposition remained
disconnected. This fragmentation ultimately hurt the

opposition cause as they were crushed by the PS in the 1983
National Assembly elections.
When President Diouf removed all restrictions on

political parties in 1981, he also eliminated all
restrictions on print media (Gellar, 2005). By the

presidential elections of 1983, there were over 20

newspapers operating in Senegal. However, the Diouf regime
kept a strict control on the radio and television
industries. This hampered the efforts of the opposition

party to become publicly known outside of the urban areas.
Most citizens in the interior were not literate and did not

receive newspapers (Gellar, 2005). The rural population
relied on the radio for political coverage of events

occurring in Dakar. Therefore, the opposition struggled to
portray their views to the majority of Senegalese citizens.

Despite this, this period of time in Senegal beginning
in 1976 gave birth to large developments for democracy.
Prior to this, Senegal had been a one-party state that was
virtually ruled by Senghor. This transition had been caused

by civil unrest and a poor economic climate, which forced
the Senegalese population to openly protest the Senghor
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regime. This civic movement had a strong effect in forcing
legal reforms to the constitution that promoted a more

democratic Senegal. It was the Senegalese population and
its voice that forced Senghor and the PS to react to its

demands. Diouf took this even further in an attempt to

separate him from the Senghorian regime and improve his
standing with the public. By doing so, he opened Senegal up

to a level of equality and freedom that were necessary for
a democratic nation.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

This would be an incomplete study if it did not
examine how democracy has fared in Senegal since the onset

of multiparty politics. As discussed in the introduction of

this study, democracy is a struggle that can easily take
steps backwards before progressing forward (Nwokedi, 1995).

Democracy is something that needs to be worked at,

especially in its earl'y stages. Progress is rarely measured
in a straight line and this certainly has been the case for

Senegal's democracy since President Diouf's reforms helped
realize multipartyism.

Modifications to the Electoral Code

Tremendous gains had been made for the Senegalese

political opposition from 1976 to 1981. However, Diouf and
the PS were still determined to remain in power, despite

their seemingly democratic interests. This became evident

when Diouf had the electoral code rewritten in the lead-up

to the 1983 elections. This rewritten code included many
changes that hurt opposition parties and would help the PS
retain their dominant position in Senegalese politics.
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One of the changes was the prohibition of electoral

coalitions in trying to win seats in the National Assembly

(Beck, 2008). Electoral coalitions are when one opposition
party works in tandem with other opposition parties in an

attempt to gain seats in an electoral vote (.Diermeier,
Kern, Medvec, & et al., 2008). It also altered the way
deputies were elected. Instead of having all deputies
elected in a proportional vote, only half would be chosen

in this way. The other half would be elected in a winner-

take-all system. Linda Beck (2008) claims that "the twolist compromise protected the PS majority while

guaranteeing symbolic representation of the increasingly
vocal opposition" (p. 59).
The effect of the new electoral code was felt for most

of the next decade. The 1988 presidential and legislative

elections came and went with the PS claiming a decisive
victory. Opposition parties went on to boycott the 1990

local elections due to the fact that the electoral code had
not been changed. The opposition believed that the current

electoral code would allow the ruling party to commit
widespread fraud. Pressure from abroad began to grow in
tandem with domestic pressures. Many international
organizations including the World Bank threatened to stop
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giving "democratic bonuses" to Senegal if it did not
provide fair democratic elections (Beck, 2008). Senegal's

fragile democracy was beginning to suffer from the apparent
lack of competition in elections.

The Splintering of the Parti Socialiste
The 1990s brought new hope to the opposition parties

in Senegal. Each presidential election during the 1990s saw
President Diouf's margin of victory diminish. The PS

majority in the National Assembly also diminished

throughout the 1990s (Beck, 2008). This led to serious

concerns among the PS leadership and they began to
reorganize in order to prepare themselves for the future.
Moreover, it led to conflict within the PS, as Minister of
the Interior Djibo Leyti Ka was passed over for first-

secretary of the PS in 1996. Ka was an economist who had

been educated at the University of Dakar and had served in

various ministry positions within the PS government.
Infuriated with what he perceived as a slight against his

character, Ka and his followers known as the renouveauteurs
publicly denounced Diouf's selection of Ousmane Tanor Dieng

as the first-secretary of the PS and were subsequently

censored by the party in November 1997. Dieng had served in
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the PS since 1978 and had been the minister in charge of

presidential services and affairs since 1993 (Beck, 2008).
The renouveauteurs responded by getting 300,000

signatures in a petition calling for a new list of
candidates from the PS for the 1998 National Assembly
elections. The PS subsequently cast out the renouveauteurs
from the party and the group created their own political

party, the L'Union pour le Renouveau Democratique (URD)
(Beck, 2008). This splintering combined with the growing

popularity of the PDS, which had emerged as the leading

opposition party, threatened the PS and its political
authority. In the 1998 National Assembly elections, the PS

received only 50.4 percent of the vote (Beck, 2008) . This
was still a majority, but the lowest percentage of votes
the PS had ever received in an election. Tensions grew in
the party as the certainty of Diouf's success in the 2000
presidential election began to disappear.
The PDS was the one opposition party that represented

a significant threat to the PS. The PDS had begun to play a
large role in Senegalese politics during the 1980s

(Schaffer, 1998). The party became associated with a number
of reforms that called for the development of democracy and

a more equal political process. The first reform was to
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create an independent commission to publish voting results

from each polling station (Schaffer, 1998). Currently, this
was handled by the Ministry of the Interior, which had been

accused of fraud in several previous elections. The PDS
also sought to have this commission handle the

administration of elections and allow all political parties
to have representatives at each polling station. Moreover,
the PDS wanted to force citizens to show identification

before they were allowed to vote to prevent illegal voters
from stuffing ballot boxes (Schaffer, 1998). The PDS wished
to lower the voting age to 18 and to citizens living
abroad. These were two groups that the PDS enjoyed

considerable support from. The right to form electoral
coalitions, equal access to state media, and a return to

secret voting were other issues that the PDS campaigned for
(Schaffer, 1998).
The PS responded by defending the electoral system

point by point. The PS argued that coalitions would lead to

an instable and weak government. They defended the option
of public voting by stating that it conformed to

traditional methods of voting in Senegal, a dubious claim
(Schaffer, 1998). In 1976, the PS had made private voting

optional, which allowed PS representatives the opportunity
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to put pressure on citizens in voting stations. The PS's

final argument was against the notion of requiring
identification before allowing a person to vote. According
to Schaffer (1998) , the PS, "... also contended that •
requiring voters to produce identification would lower

voter turnout, and waste time at the polling stations" (p.

28) .
The clear differences between the PS and the PDS came

to a head in 1988. In February 1988, Diouf was reelected as
president and a chorus of protests broke out claiming

election fraud. Diouf had received 73.5 percent of the vote
and the PDS candidate Abdoulaye Wade received 25.8 percent

of the presidential vote. In the general election, the PS
won 103 out of 120 seats and the PDS won the other 17

(Clark & Phillips, 1994). There was a large controversy as
some observers stated there had been fewer voter
irregularities, but the opposition believed there had been

ballot-box stuffing and voting fraud. Protestors began
burning buses used for public transportation in Dakar .and
other urban areas (Schaffer, 1998). Senegal was declared to

be in a state of emergency and opposition leaders including

Wade were imprisoned for several months by the PS.
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Reexamining the Electoral Code
The outcry of the populace and the boycott of the 1990

local elections by opposition parties was enough to force

Diouf to reexamine the electoral process. In 1991, Diouf
announced the decision to create an independent commission
to develop a new electoral code. The commission was

comprised of members from each political party and had an

independent magistrate to preside over it (Schaffer, 1998).
The process took less than a year and included many of the

PDS reforms. The most prominent PDS reforms included were
the mandatory use of private voting booths, required voter

identification, a reduction in the voting age to 18, and
legalized political party coalitions. The final piece of

the new electoral code gave authorization to each political

party to monitor, participate, and supervise various stages
of the electoral process (Schaffer, 1998). This new

transparency regarding the election process was applauded

around Senegal and internationally. Moreover, it promised a

fair environment where voters were protected from being
intimidated into voting for any one party. Also, it

prevented any party from stuffing ballot boxes or using
fake names to inflate their vote counts. These political
regulations helped improve Senegal's status as a democracy.
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Unequal access to state media finally began to change

during this time as well with the creation of the Haut
Conseil de la Radio-Television (HCRT) in 1992 (Gellar,
2005). The council was charged with the responsibility of

setting guidelines to provide better access to state media
for opposition parties and to observe the government's

cooperation with the guidelines. During the campaign season

leading up to the 1993 presidential elections, opposition
parties had the most access to radio and television in
their history (Gellar, 2005). This was an important change
for Senegal, where the ruling party had always held a

monopoly over the media. Moreover, radio represented the

predominant method for citizens to get educated on the
political candidates and issues involved with each

election. Print media was still rare outside of the urban

areas and for citizens living in rural areas; they relied
on the radio to stay involved with the political goings

occurring in Dakar.

The 2000 Presidential Election
With all of the gains made by the opposition during
the 1990s, the PS grew uncertain that Diouf would be able

to win the 2000 president election in the first round. In
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order for a candidate to achieve victory in the first round

of an election, they must receive the votes of at least 25

percent of registered voters (Beck, 2008). To combat this,
the PS passed a constitutional reform eliminating the 25

percent requirement and required the winning candidate to
just receive a majority of the votes cast in the first
round (Beck, 2008).
The PS hoped to gain enough votes against a scattered

opposition to win in the first round. The PS was aware that
the opposition would be united against Diouf if the voting

went to a second round. However, the likelihood of avoiding
the second round grew even slimmer when Moustapha Niasse, a

former minister, formed the Alliances des Forces de Progres
(AFP) and split from the PS in 1999 (Beck, 2008). Niasse
had served briefly as prime minster of Senegal in 1983 and

had held the post of foreign minister until leaving the PS.

To make things worse for Diouf, opposition parties had
already begun rallying behind Abdoulaye Wade as it became

clear he was the strongest candidate of the opposition.
The buildup to the 2000 election created a volatile

atmosphere. Tensions continued to grow when nearby Cote
d'Ivoire had a coup d'etat in 1999 (Beck, 2008). Wade

encouraged this tense atmosphere by making statements in
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December 1999, calling on the army and youths to rise up if

Diouf won re-election unfairly (Beck', 2008). These two
events created a dangerous environment in Senegal. Wade

later clarified his remark by stating that he simply would
not tolerate any cheating or fraud in the election, not

that he was necessarily opposed to Diouf retaining the
presidency as long as Diouf won the election fairly (Beck,

2008). Another important aspect of the campaign before the
election was the use of language. Wade adopted the Wolof

word sopi meaning "change" as his slogan. Diouf used the
French phrase Le Changement dans la Continuite meaning

"Change in Continuity" as his. Wade's ability to move back
and forth between French and Wolof appealed to many rural

Senegalese voters, whereas Diouf felt most comfortable

campaigning in French (Gellar, 2005).
The press played a huge role in the dynamics of the
campaign during this time as newly approved private radio

stations provided independent analysis of the election. A
notable example of this was Oxy-Jeunes, who setup a

campaign to get the Senegalese people- to listen in,
register, and vote in the upcoming election. Other
prominent radio stations included Sud-FM and Wal-Fadj ri-FM,

who helped organize political debates in Wolof (Gellar,
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2005). It also granted a newfound transparency of the

election as the PS did not have control over all of the
media commentating on the election.
On February 27, 2000, the first round of voting was

held in Senegal. This did not go as planned the PS, as

Diouf was forced into a second round of voting after only
receiving 41.3 percent of the cast vote. PDS candidate Wade
also gained a slot in the second round of the voting after

receiving 31.3 percent of the vote (Beck, 2008). The two
former PS party members who had left to form their own

political parties, Ka and Niasse, received a combined total

of 23.9 percent of the vote with the rest going to smaller
opposition candidates (Beck, 2008). The defections of Ka
and Niasse with their supporters proved costly to Diouf and
the PS as it prevented them from winning the election in
the first round of voting.

The second round of voting was scheduled for March 19,

2000. Leading up to the second round of voting, Wade

initially enjoyed the support of Ka, Niasse, and the other
opposition parties. Wade had promised Niasse the post of
prime minister if he was elected, so Niasse was firm in his

support of Wade. Ka was also promised a high position in
the new government by Wade, but Diouf offered him the post
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of prime minister in his government if he was re-elected
(Beck, 2008). This was enough to convince Ka to defect his
support from Wade to Diouf. However, the late timing of

this action proved costly to Diouf because Ka's supporters
ended up splitting their votes between Diouf and Wade

(Beck, 2008). As a result, Wade easily won the second round

of voting with an overwhelming margin of 58.9 percent of
the vote. For the first time in Senegal's history, the PS

had been defeated in an election and Diouf peacefully left

office.

This represented a huge event in the development of

Senegal's democracy. A peaceful political transfer of power
is often viewed as one of the most crucial standards of a

democracy. According to the U.S. Department of State
(2010) , the 2000 president election was approved as fair,
free, and transparent. Senegal achieved a new level of
legitimacy as the PDS had unseated the ruling PS party.

Diouf was willing to do what many rulers in Africa had been
unwilling to do by stepping away from power peacefully

(Doyle, 2000) . By abiding by the constitution, Diouf helped

democracy become a reality in Senegal.
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Summary
Democracy is not a style of government that is easily
achieved or easily defined. There are a multitude of

definitions that exist trying to get a firm grasp on what
democracy truly is. To make this more difficult, the
question of whether democracy is a different phenomenon in

different parts of the world exists. This study has

attempted to answer what democracy is, particularly in

Africa in the country of Senegal and how it developed. By
studying Senegalese history and political events throughout
the twentieth century, it is clearer how Senegal is unique

from many other African nations.
From the literature review

this thesis generated a

general definition of democracy. Democracy is a style of
government that has competitive, multiparty political

elections that are fair, free, and held on a regular basis.
Civil liberties such as freedom of assembly, organization,
and speech should be established and protected by the

constitution. Also, a critical media should exist that

provides coverage free from state influence. All political

parties should share equal access to this media as well.
There should be a set of institutionalized standards that

prevent the party in power from exploiting that power
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either to their own benefit or to the harm of the political

opposition. Finally, democracy should provide an
environment where economic and social freedoms exist and
are available to its citizens.

Now it is necessary to apply this definition to the

reality of Africa and in particular Senegal. Some authors
would argue that the European colonization of the continent
did nothing but disrupt a natural path of African culture

and modernization (Cesaire, 1973 and Fanon, 1963). Other

authors argue that the adoption of colonial institutions,
both economic and political, have contributed greatly to
the poor standard of living in Senegal and other parts of
Africa (Boye, 1993, Davidson, 1992, Gellar, 2005, and
Mbodj, 1993). These are all realities that each African

country faced as it undertook the process of decolonization

from European rule.

African democracy as it exists has often fallen short
of Western standards of what democracy should be. Another

question that needs to be answers is whether African

democracy should be held to the same standard as Western
democracy. Author such as Richburg (2008) say yes, whereas
Ake (1993) and Wafarova (2008) argue no. According to the

latter authors, the cultural differences and historical
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experiences of Africa will provide for a different type of

democracy than that of the West.
These differences are not a matter of the willingness

of African nations to try democracy. Senegal, like many
other African nations, gave democracy a chance in the years
after independence. However, what was unique was Senegal's

determination and patience to stick with democracy despite
years of one-party rule and poor economic circumstances.

Instead of resulting to revolutions or military rule,
Senegal's political actors and general population worked

towards a better government. The Senegalese experience with
democracy shows that democracy is possible in Africa. It is
a complex and difficult process and it should not be

surprising if the development of democracy is slow or even
suffers from setbacks. However, democracy appears to be
here to stay in Senegal and this is a triumph not just for
the Senegalese people or Africa, but for the world and

democracies everywhere.

Recommendations
The process of decolonizing from French rule and

establishing a democracy has been a tenuous process for

Senegal. Beginning with French colonialism, through
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independence, and leading up to the Wade's presidential
election in 2000 Senegal has struggled. At times, Senghor
and Diouf seemed to encourage the growth of a better
democracy, and at others times seemed intent of keeping

themselves in power indefinitely. However, both men stepped
down peacefully from power and did not cause conflicts that
have been present in many African countries. Senegal has

successfully moved towards a democracy, but it is still
fairly young and could be derailed. This is especially true

in a political environment where the presidency and the

access to state resources are the ultimate spoils of
winning an election (Gellar, 2005). Senegal needs to

continue developing its democracy, educating its citizens,
and creating regulations that will protect the progress

that has already been made.
As has.been previous mentioned in the study, economic

opportunity is often tied to democracy. Therefore,
economics has become and will continue to be a major
feature in the success of Senegal's democracy. According to
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

(2010), Senegal in 2009 experienced a decline in private
investment, less tourism, and fewer remittances leading to

an aggregate reduction in economic activity. Senegal's real
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gross domestic product only grew by 1.5 percent in 2009.

Once the global economic crisis is recovered, Senegal needs

to take steps to improve its economy. Economic growth for
the country and more economic opportunities for its

citizens will benefit Senegal's democracy immensely.
Another threat to Senegal's democracy is the defection

of politicians from opposition parties to the ruling party.
Ruling party members are granted high-level government

positions such as minister of a specific agency, which
offer lucrative benefits and the ability to provide for

one's family and friends (Gellar, 2005). However, if

politicians do not truly represent their ideologies and
bandwagon with whatever party is in power, this will weaken
the healthy competition that is necessary for a democracy

to be successful. It is important for Senegal to guard

against this and have established penalties for politicians
that engage in this behavior if it is driven by personal

gain. Politicians need to abide by the constitution and not

abuse their positions for their own needs. This is true

especially for the president, since many African leaders
have abolished laws or legislative bodies to stay in power.
If Senegal can accomplish these things, it will bode well

for its future as a democracy.
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Further development of the Senegalese population as
involved citizens should be a high priority for the

country. The people need to have easy access to media

sources that will provide them with the issues involving
the government and the position that each politician takes

on these. The number of newspapers that are in print does
not guarantee that all citizens are aware of the political

issues. Newspapers tend to only be read by affluent
citizens who could afford them and read French. Independent

radio stations have the ability to reach a larger
population of Senegalese as they are broadcast in Wolof,
which is spoken by nearly 80 percent of the population

(Gellar, 2005).
In recent elections, political debates were often

organized and broadcast over the radio allowing
constituents the chance to hear each party's position on

different political issues (Gellar, 2005). In fact, a

national survey in 2000 showed that showed that 62.2
percent of people used the radio as their main source of
information during the buildup to the 2000 presidential

election. This is compared to only 2 percent of people who
got their information from print media. This represents an
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opportunity for Senegalese political parties to introduce
themselves to the Senegalese people.

Implications for Future Research
There are several areas regarding Senegalese democracy

that could be researched and provide quality findings. The
study of how Senegal's economy has grown since independence
would be a worthy endeavor. Senegal has maintained close
economic ties with France and now China and the U.S. in

recent times. Economics and politics have always been
closely linked and it would be beneficial to understand how
economic failures and successes affected Senegal's
politics. Also, this thesis focuses predominantly on the

internal affairs of Senegal, with the exception of

examining their colonial relationship with France.
Therefore, a research project on Senegal's foreign policy
and international relations throughout the 20th century

could provide other insights regarding Senegalese

democracy. Skurnik (1972) examines Senegal's foreign policy
and the effects it has on the country. However, he does not

focus on the effects of foreign policy on democratic

development.
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For more current studies, it would be prudent to

research how Senegal's status as an Islamic country is

currently affecting events in the nation. Given that the
Middle East has a series of conflicts ongoing it would be
interesting to see if Senegal has made closer ties with the
Middle East or distanced itself from it. This would give

serious implications to the direction the government is

trying to take Senegal. Moreover, there is some evidence

that Wade has moved Senegal away from the peak of its
democracy in 2000 in the last decade (Sy, 2005 and Sy,

2007). There are rumors that Wade's son, Karim Wade, is

being trained as his potential successor. Some fears of

this were assuaged with the PDS defeat in the March 2009
regional elections, which saw Karim Wade lose a mayoral
race for Dakar (Bojang, 2009). Regardless, this is a topic
that warrants further investigation.

Also, there have been studies on Senegalese-Sino

relations and how these have developed over the past few

decades. It could be argued,that Senegal is moving away
from Western partnerships to Asian partnerships and this is
something that deserves to be looked at in-depth. Senegal

is a strategic point on Africa, not just for its geographic
location, but by nature of it being a democracy. Anything
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that threatened this deserves to be studied on a deep
level.
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